There are many reasons why I do not think that the Prime Minister has any chance of making a meaningful change to the Irish backstop, of course, rather than the kind of change with which her hard Brexita MEPs are satisfied.
The cardinal among them is that many of these same Members are not really clear about what is backstop and where it comes from.
The Irish backstop is an emergency action plan for what happens if the UK and the EU cannot find solutions to keep the Irish border as open as it is at the end of the transition period; currently in December.
It is the Irish Government's final insurance policy, which allowed Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar to return to his parliament and voters and say that he has not allowed the British to leave the EU, leaving Ireland and its country. border control communities.
It was while we were, many supporters of Northern Ireland; much of this is considered the best way to save the Greater Friday agreement – except, in particular, the Theresa May parliamentary partners – DUP.
The return began at the December 2017 European Council summit.
Mrs May agreed as a means to move on to the next round of Brexit talks.
Her Brexitā wing just created a sound, obviously not worrying about its logical impact on politics.
No government minister, including Boris Johnson or David Davis, left.
Instead, they congratulated their prime minister on making substantial progress, which many considered impossible and enjoyed in Brexit's way.
After nine months they suddenly woke up and changed.
They realized that such retrospective effect stems from the fact that, if no other agreement could be reached, we would get by default with the "soft" Brexit form, with the DUP claiming that it would divide Britain into Ulster.
This week they forced the Prime Minister to commit to withdrawing completely from his withdrawal agreement or radically changing.
Downing Street and some "hard" Brexit support members have suggested that such changes could be included; 1. Unilateral withdrawal clause for the United Kingdom; 2) the term or; 3) Reduce backwardness with technological solutions.
This is why the understanding of MEPs seems to be different from reality because any of them neutralizes backward force as, erm, backstop.
It would no longer be an insurance policy that would be designed.
The unilateral withdrawal clause does not provide any guarantee, as the United Kingdom will simply be able to leave it.
Imagine you have an insurance policy in which your insurer could choose to go away only when your house burns.
If it were not extremely long (thus not improving the policy of Brexiteers), it would be the same.
And Ireland's doubts about the reliability of the technological solution were first and foremost closely linked to the backstop.
The reason why Irish asked for its creation is because they did not believe that the UK could develop technology-based solutions or otherwise in the two years to the end of the transition period.
The idea that the government will be able to go to them in two weeks seems distant.
That's why none of the solutions offered by Downing Street or Tory parliamentarians does not remove the need for a reverse.
Indeed, they affirm in the Irish mind why it was first needed.
That is why the EU does not participate.
But maybe some of Tory's Eurosceptic European Research Group (ERG) knows it all.
They are aware that Ireland and the EU cannot refuse, but their vote on Brady's amendment on Tuesday night, which demanded the replacement of "retaliatory measures", allows them to say that they tried to negotiate and the EU failed to fail.
Downing Street probably knows it.
My rating is 10th, which agreed to try to make changes to buy two weeks extra time and run time.
Try everything you can to see the whites of the MEPs as close as possible to March – and dare to vote again for a deal and risk without a deal.
That's why I suspect that the sources of work at Jeremy Corbyn's office were surprised at how warmly Mrs May's revelation has been at their meeting on Wednesday afternoon.
She knows she will need a plan B.
The Prime Minister quietly has a two-way strategy.
After all, Ms. May certainly played her last card with her party.
Tuesday night perfectly complemented the prime minister's cycle and rhythms.
She gets in danger, she promises change to buy time, she can't deliver it, so she promises something bigger to buy even more time.
But, every time, she supports herself in a tougher and tighter corner, trapping her oath.
After all, it is this strategy, which first of all strengthened the prime minister.
But now there is no one left in the army, a greater promise that May could make, and a little bit of sand left in the sand clock.
So ultimately Brexit will come down.
Will the MEPs who are afraid of the deal stop enough to withdraw from Mrs May's plan?
Or can the labor force attract enough soft Brexitā Tory members with their own ideas, which may even resemble the "Norwegian model"?
The oldest assistant to Mr Corbyn was painful to tell me that the official opposition amendment by the employer, offering softer Brexit, was 292 votes on Tuesday evening.
Much more than two weeks ago was the Prime Minister's plan.
They would not need many soft Brexit supporters, Tory MEPs, to support it if the government seemed to be unable to hand over anything.
Could they offer such a deal – abandoning the expectation of a general election, as they rightly believe that the rescue rig could allow her to divide and sink the conservative party?
You should never ask a question in politics if you don't know the answer.
When the EU asked for a change back, the Prime Minister and the leaders of the ERG were indeed already.
But they can beware, as Mr Corbyn and Mr Lab can have their own answers.